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NOTES AND

COMMENT

*DIvoRcE AND MARRIAGES-"When May a Divorcee Remarry?"

The passage (May 18th) of Chapter 117 of the Session Laws of 1931
amending Section 247.37 of the Wisconsin Statutes, relating to judgments or decrees of divorce, created a irreconcilable conflict between
that section and Section 245.03 relating to persons who may not
marry.
Sec. 247.37 before it was amended provided that the decree granting a divorce did not become effective until one year after the entry
of judgment. People granted a divorce were often misled to believe
that they could re-marry one year after the granting of the decree,
where in reality if their attorney had failed to duly enter judgment
until some time after the granting of the decree the year had not fully
elapsed. There are numerous reasons why many Attorneys fail or "neglect" to have judgments entered, which will not be discussed-but
suffice to say, that there was an unfortunate situation created for
many divorcees because of the general misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the Statutes. Accordingly, it must be concluded that it
was the purpose of the Legislature to remedy this situation which
they sought to do by ammending Sec. 247.37 to read (1) "When a
judgment or decree of divorce from the bonds of matrimony is granted so far as it affects the status of the parties it shall not be effective
until the expiration of one year from the date of the * * * granting
of such judgment or decree."
(4) * * * "At the expiration of such year such judgment or decree shall become final and conclusive without further proceedings:"
It is clearly ascertainable that the Legislative purpose in ammending
said Section 247.37 was to make it possible for divorced persons to remarry after one year from the granting of the judgment or decree.
But the Legislature failed in its purpose by an oversight in not ammending at the same time, Section 245.03 which provides, "Sec. 2It shall not be lawful for any person who is a party to an action for
divorce from the bonds of matrimony, in any court in this State 'to
marry again-until one year after judgment of divorce is entered, and
the marriage of any such persons solemnized before the expiration of
one year from the date of the entry of judgment of divorce shall be
null and void."
Laws pari materia must be construed with reference to each other
(Bouvier's Law Dic.). What, then, is the situation with reference to
*The discrepancy discussed in this article was discovered by Professor Lang

of the faculty of Marquette Law School.
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the status of people now being granted a divorce, or having been
granted a divorce since May 18, 1931? Relative to the construction
and operation of Statutes, one of the earliest Wisconsin Cases held:
"Where two acts are apparently conflicting, they should if possible
be so construed as to give operation to both without doing violence
to either." (Att. Gen. ex rel. Taylor v. Brown, 1 Wis. 442. And
in State ex rel. Plowman v. Lear (176 Wis. 406) the court said,
"Statutes in pari materia must be construed together and recourse
must also be had to the object of the Legislature and the rights obviously sought to be safeguarded." But in the present instance if the
courts construe and give operation to both Sec. 247.37 and Sec. 245.03,
which they must do, the very purpose of the Legislature in ammending Sec. 247.37 is defeated. Tracing the history of both Sec. 247.37
and 245.03, we find that both of these sections had their inception
in the Wisconsin Statutes of 1849 (245.03 see Stat. 1849,C.78,S.3;
247.37 see Stat. 1849,C.79,S.35). It was not until 1901 that Sec. 245.03
was ammended to the form that closely resembles the section as it is
today.
Historically speaking, Chapter 239 of the Laws of 1911 provide
us with the clearest proof that the legislature originally intended that
both Sec. 245.03 and Sec. 247.37 were to be interpreted in the light
of, and in relation to each other. Said Chapter 239 provides for the
ammendment of Sub. 2 of Sec. 245.03 and further provides for,
what was then, a new section, numbered 247.37 (Note: Chapter 4 of
the Laws of 1925 provided in part that Sec. 2330 and 2374 be renumbered Sec. 245.03 and Sec. 247.37 respectively). The ammendment referred to, ammends Sec. 245.03 to its present form (see
above) and the new section established provided "When a judgment
from the bonds of matrimony is granted in this State by a court, such
judgment, so far as it determines the status of the parties shall not
be effective, * * * until the expiration of one year from the date of
entry of such judgment." Sec. 247.37 therefore, was the direct outgrowth of Sec. 245.03 and as such must be viewed with the Legislature's original intent as laws pari materia. Both of these sections
are so closely inter-related in their effect that to ammend one practically necessitates the same ammendment in the other.
My conclusion is that Sec. 247.37 as it stands today in its ammended form, restores the status of a divorced person, one year after
the granting of the decree, to that of an unmarried person in every
respect, except that such divorced person cannot re-marry one year
after the granting of the decree but must wait until one year after
the entry of judgment.
We must therefore conclude that the evil misapprehension re-
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ferred to in the second paragraph of this article has not been remedied and still exists. Perhaps the confusion has been increased by the
very act that was meant to remove it.
NATHAN

W.

HELLER.

WILLS-UNDUE INFLUENCE.
Undue influence in the law of Wills
is a subject of vital importance, in that the validity or non-validity of
the instrument purporting to be a will is dependent on the existence or
non-existence of the various elements essential to constitute such undue
influence.
The supreme court of Wisconsin In re Jackman's Will, 26 Wis.
104, held that undue influence sufficient to invalidate a will, must be of
such a nature as to in some degree destroy the free agency of the testator and constrain him to do something against his will, so as to virtually render the testamentary act the will of another rather than that of
the testator. That is, to constitute undue influence in the eyes of the law
sufficient to set aside a will there must not only be an opportunity to
influence, a disposition to influence and the coveted result, but the
obtaining of the result must be by coercion of the testator.' In stressing
the fact that coercion was a necessary element to establish undue influence many cases have held that such influence must be so exercised
as to amount to moral coercion; resulting in destroying the testator's
2
free will and independent action.
In re Slinger's Will, 72 Wis. 22, 37 N.W. 236, the evidence showed
that the testator, a man about 70 years of age, who had been a habitual
drunkard for 50 years and had become a victim of an uncontrolable
appetite for drinking, suddenly inherited considerable property from a
daughter whom he had not seen since she was a child; that he was
placed under guardianship as a spendthrift; that he went, against the
will of his guardian, to live with his younger brother, who was a saloon
keeper and had offered him a home as long as he lived, with full and
free opportunity to drink when and what he pleased while there; and
that after drinking to some extent, he made a will giving all property
to such brother. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to
sustain a finding that such will was the result of undue influence and
refused probate of the instrument as the will of the testator, laying
down the well-settled rule, that where the party to be benefited by the

I In re Bocker's Will, 167 Wis. 100, 166. N.W. 660.
2 Anderson v. Laugen, 122 Wis. 57, 99 N.W. 437. In re Evenson's Will, 152 Wis.
113, 139 N.W. 766.

